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Abstract
The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the
worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium — solution of the game — and that
of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous impact of tools from mathematical programming
in the design of algorithms and the similarity of the price of anarchy and different measures such
as the approximation and competitive ratios, it is intriguing to develop a duality-based method
to characterize the efficiency of games.
In the paper, we present an approach based on linear programming duality to study the
efficiency of games. We show that the approach provides a general recipe to analyze the effi-
ciency of games and also to derive concepts leading to improvements. The approach is particu-
larly appropriate to bound the PoA. Specifically, in our approach the dual programs naturally
lead to competitive PoA bounds that are (almost) optimal for several classes of games. The
approach indeed captures the smoothness framework and also some current non-smooth tech-
niques/concepts. We show the applicability to the wide variety of games and environments, from
congestion games to Bayesian welfare, from full-information settings to incomplete-information
ones.
∗Research supported by the ANR project OATA no ANR-15-CE40-0015-01
1 Introduction
Algorithmic Game Theory — a domain at the intersection of Game Theory and Algorithms — has
been extensively studied in the last two decades. The development of the domain, as well as those
of many other research fields, have witnessed a common phenomenon: interesting notions, results
have been flourished at the early stage, then deep methods, techniques have been established at a
more mature stage leading to further achievements. In Algorithmic Game Theory, a representative
illustration is the notion and results on the price of anarchy and the smoothness argument method
[34]. In a game, the price of anarchy (PoA) [19] is defined as the worst ratio between the cost of a
Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution. The PoA is now considered as standard and is
the most popular measure to characterize the inefficiency of Nash equilibria — solutions of a game
— in the same sense of approximation ratio in Approximation Algorithms and competitive ratio in
Online Algorithms.
Mathematical programming in general and linear programming in particular are powerful tools
in many research fields. Among others, linear programming has a tremendous impact on the design
of algorithms. Linear programming and duality play crucial and fundamental roles in several elegant
methods such as primal-dual and dual-fitting in Approximation Algorithms [45] and online primal-
dual framework [8] in Online Algorithms. Given the similarity of the notions of PoA, approximation
and competitive ratios, it is intriguing and also desirable to develop a method based on duality to
characterize the PoA of games. In this paper, we present and aim at developing a framework based
on linear programming duality to study the efficiency of games.
1.1 A primal-dual approach
In high-level, the approach follows the standard primal-dual or dual-fitting techniques in approxi-
mation/online algorithms. The approach consists of associating a game to an optimization problem
and formulate an integer program corresponding to the problem. Next consider the linear program
by relaxing the integer constraints and its dual LP. Then given a Nash equilibrium, construct dual
variables in such a way that one can relate the dual objective to the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
The PoA is then bounded by the primal objective (essentially, the cost of the Nash equilibrium)
and the dual objective (a lower bound of the optimum cost by weak duality). This approach has
been initiated by Kulkarni and Mirrokni [21] in which full-information games with convex objective
functions have been considered.
There are two crucial steps in the approach. First, by this method, the bound of PoA is at least
as large as the integrality gap. Hence, to prove optimal PoA one has to derive a formulation (of
the corresponding optimization problem) whose the integrality gap matches to the optimal PoA.
This is very similar to the issue of linear-programming-based approaches in Approximation/Online
Algorithms. The second crucial step is the construction of dual variables. The dual variables need
to reflect the notion of Nash equilibria as well as their properties in order to relate to the cost of
the equilibrium. Intuitively, to prove optimal bound on the PoA, the constructed dual variables
must constitute an optimal dual solution.
To overcome these obstacles, in the paper we systematically consider configuration linear pro-
grams and a primal-dual approach. Given a problem (game), we first consider a natural formulation
of the problem. Then, the approach consists of introducing exponential variables and constraints
to the natural formulation to get a configuration LP. The additional constraints we use throughout
the paper have intuitive and simple interpretations: one constraint guarantees that the game ad-
mits exactly one outcome and the other constraint ensures that if a player uses a strategy then this
strategy must be a component of the outcome. As the result, the configuration LPs significantly
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improve integrality gap over that of the natural formulations.
The configuration LPs have been considered in approximation algorithms and to the best of
our knowledge, the main approach is rounding. Here, to study the efficiency of games, we consider
a primal-dual approach. The primal-dual approach is very appropriate to study the PoA through
the mean of configuration LPs. In the dual program of our configuration programs, the dual
constraints naturally lead to the construction of dual variables and the PoA bounds. Intuitively, one
dual constraint corresponds exactly to the definition of Nash equilibrium and the other constraint
settles the PoA bounds.
1.2 Overview of Results
We illustrate the potential and the wide applicability of the approach throughout various results in
the contexts of complete and incomplete-information environments, from the settings of congestion
games to welfare maximization. The approach allows us to unify several previous results and
establish new ones beyond the current techniques. It is worthy to note that the analyses are simple
and are guided by dual LP very much in the sense of primal-dual methods in designing algorithms.
Moreover, under the lens of LP duality, the notion of smooth games in both full-information settings
[34] and incomplete-information settings [35, 41], the recent notion of no-envy learning [12] and
the new notion of dual smooth (in this paper) can be naturally derived, which lead to the optimal
bounds on the PoA of several games.
1.2.1 Smooth Games in Full-Information Settings
We first revisit smooth games by the primal-dual approach and show that the primal-dual ap-
proach captures the smoothness framework [34]. Roughgarden [34] has introduced the smoothness
framework, which becomes quickly a standard technique, and shown that every (λ, µ)-smooth game
admits the PoA at most λ/(1− µ). Through the duality approach, we show that in terms of tech-
niques to study the PoA for complete information settings, the LP duality and the smoothness
framework are exactly the same thing. Specifically, one of the dual constraint corresponds exactly
to the definition of smooth games given in [34].
Informal Theorem 1 The primal-dual approach captures the smoothness framework in full-
information settings.
1.2.2 Congestion Games
We consider fundamental classes of congestion games in which we revisit and unify results in
the atomic, non-atomic congestion games and prove the optimal PoA bound of coarse correlated
equilibria in splittable congestion games.
Atomic congestion games. In this class, although the PoA bound follows the results for smooth
games, we provide another configuration formulation and a similar primal-dual approach. The
purpose of this formulation is twofold. First it shows the flexibility of the primal-dual approach.
Second, it sets up the ground for an unified approach to other classes of the congestion games.
Non-atomic congestion games. In this class, we re-prove the optimal PoA bound [38]. Along
the line toward the optimal PoA bound for non-atomic congestion games, the equilibrium charac-
terization by a variational inequality is at the core of the analyses [38, 11, 10]. In our proof, we
establish the optimal PoA directly by the mean of LP duality. By the LP duality as the unified
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approach, one can clearly observe that non-atomic setting is a version of the atomic setting in large
games (in the sense of [15]) in which each player weight becomes negligible (hence, the PoA of the
former tends to that of the latter). Besides, an advantage with LP approaches is that one can
benefit from powerful techniques that have been developing for linear programming. Concretely,
using the general framework on resource augmentation and primal-dual recently presented [24], we
manage to recover and extend a resource augmentation result related to non-atomic setting [37].
Informal Theorem 2 In every non-atomic congestion game, for any constant r > 0, the cost of
an equilibrium in a game is at most 1/r that of an optimal solution in a similar game in which the
flow amount of each demand is multiplied by a factor (1 + r) for r > 0.
Splittable congestion games. Roughgarden and Schoppmann [36] has presented a local smooth-
ness property, a refinement of the smoothness framework, and proved that every (λ, µ)-local-smooth
splittable game admits the PoA λ/(1 − µ). This bound is tight for a large class of scalable cost
functions in splittable games and holds for PoA of pure, mixed, correlated equilibria. However,
this bound does not hold for coarse correlated equilibria and it remains an intriguing open question
raised in [36]. Building upon the resilient ideas of non-atomic and atomic settings, we define a
property, called dual smoothness, which is inspired by the dual constraints. This new notion indeed
leads to the tight PoA bound for coarse correlated equilibria in splittable games for a large class of
cost functions (the matching lower bound is given in [36] and that holds even for pure equilibria).
Definition 1 A cost function ℓ : R+ → R+ is (λ, µ)-dual-smooth if for every vectors u =
(u1, . . . , un) and v = (v1, . . . , vn),
vℓ(u) +
n∑
i=1
ui(vi − ui) · ℓ
′(u) ≤ λ · vℓ(v) + µ · uℓ(u)
where u =
∑n
i=1 ui and v =
∑n
i=1 vi. A splittable congestion game is (λ, µ)-dual-smooth if every
resource e in the game, function ℓe is (λ, µ)-dual-smooth.
Informal Theorem 3 For every (λ, µ)-dual-smooth splittable congestion game G, the price of
anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria of G is at most λ/(1− µ). This bound is tight for the class
of scalable cost functions.
1.2.3 Welfare Maximization
We next consider the inefficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria in the context of welfare maximization.
Smooth Auctions. The notion of smooth auctions in incomplete-information settings, inspired
by the original smoothness framework [34], has been introduced by Roughgarden [35], Syrgkanis and
Tardos [41]. This powerful notion has been widely used to study the PoA of Bayes-Nash equilibria
(see the recent survey [39]). We show that the primal-dual approach captures the smoothness
framework in incomplete-information settings. In other words, the notion of smooth auctions can
be naturally derived from dual constraints in the primal-dual approach.
Informal Theorem 4 The primal-dual approach captures the smoothness framework in incom-
plete-information settings.
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Simultaneous Item-Bidding Auctions. Many price-of-anarchy bounds in auctions are settled
by smoothness-based proofs. However, there are price-of-anarchy bounds for auctions proved via
non-smooth techniques and these techniques seem more powerful than the smoothness framework
in such auctions. Representative examples are the simultaneous first- and second-price auctions
where players’ valuations are sub-additive. Feldman et al. [14] have proved that the PoA is constant
while the smooth argument gives only logarithmic guarantees. We show that in this context, our
approach is beyond the smoothness framework and also captures the non-smooth arguments in [14]
by re-establishing their results. Specifically, a main step in our analysis — proving the feasibility
of a dual constraint — corresponds exactly to a crucial claim in [14]. From this point of view, the
primal-dual approach helps to identify the key steps in settling the PoA bounds.
Informal Theorem 5 ([14]) Assume that players have independent distributions over sub-additive
valuations. Then, every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a first-price auction and of a second price auc-
tion has expected welfare at least 1/2 and 1/4 of the maximal welfare, respectively.
Subsequently, we illuminate the potential of the primal-dual approach in formulating new con-
cepts. Concretely, Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [12] have very recently introduced no-envy learning
dynamic — a novel concept of learning in auctions. No-envy dynamics have advantages over no-
regret dynamics. In particular, no-envy outcomes maintain the approximate welfare optimality of
no-regret outcomes while ensuring the computational tractability. Surprisingly, there is a connec-
tion between the primal-dual approach and no-envy dynamics. Indeed, the latter can be naturally
derived from the dual constraints very much in the same way as the smoothness argument is. We
show this connection by revisiting the following theorem by the means of the primal-dual approach.
Informal Theorem 6 ([12]) Every no-envy dynamic has the average welfare at least half the
expected optimal welfare.
Sequential Auctions. To illustrate the applicability of the primal-dual approach, we consider
thereafter another format of auctions — sequential auctions. In a simple model of sequential
auctions, items are sold one-by-one via single-item auctions. Sequential auctions has a long and
rich literature [20] and sequentially selling items leads to complex issues in analyzing PoA. Leme
et al. [23], Syrgkanis and Tardos [40] have studied sequential auctions for matching markets and
matroid auctions in complete and incomplete-information settings in which at each step, an item
is sold via the first-price auctions. In this paper, we consider the sequential auctions for sponsored
search via the second-price auctions. Informally, auctioneer sells advertizing slots one-by-one in
the non-increasing order of click-though-rates (from the most attractive to the least one). At each
step, players submit bid for the currently-selling slot and the highest-bid player receives the slot
and pays the second highest bid. In the auction, we study the PoA of perfect Bayesian equilibria
and show the following improvement over the best-known PoA bound of 2.927 [9] for the sponsored
search problem.
Informal Theorem 7 The PoA of sequential second-price auctions for the sponsored search prob-
lem is at most 2.
An observation is that although the behaviour of players in sequential auctions might be complex,
the performance guarantee is better than the currently best-known one for simultaneous second
price auctions for the sponsored search problem. Consequently, this result shows that the efficiency
of sequential auctions is not necessarily worse than the simultaneous ones (and also analyzing
4
sequential auction is not necessarily harder than analyzing simultaneous ones). Moreover, using
the primal-dual approach, the proof is fairly simpler than the smoothness-based one.
Building upon the resilient ideas for the sponsored search problem, we provide an improved PoA
bound of 2 for the matching market problem for which the best known PoA bound is 2e/(e− 1) ≈
3.16 due to Syrgkanis and Tardos [40]. That also answers an question raised in [40] whether the
PoA in the incomplete-information settings must be strictly larger than the best-known PoA bound
(which is 2) in the full-information settings.
Informal Theorem 8 The PoA of sequential first-price auctions for the matching market problem
is at most 2.
1.3 Related works
As the main point of the paper is to emphasize the primal-dual approach to study game efficiency,
in this section we mostly concentrate on currently existing methods. Concrete related results will
be summarized in the corresponding sections.
The most closely related to our work is a recent result of [21]. In their approach, Kulkarni
and Mirrokni [21] considered a convex formulation of a given game and its dual program based on
Fenchel duality. Then, given a Nash equilibrium, the dual variables are constructed by relating
the cost of the Nash equilibrium to that of the dual objective. In high-level, our approach has
the same idea in [21] and both approaches indeed have inspired by the standard primal-dual and
dual-fitting in the design of algorithms. Our approach is distinguished to that in [21] in the
following two aspects. First, we consider arbitrary (non-decreasing) objective functions and make
use of configuration LPs in order to reduce substantially the integrality gap while the approach
in [21] needs convex objective functions. In term of approaches based on mathematical programs
in approximation algorithms, we have come up with stronger formulations than those in [21] — a
crucial point toward optimal bounds. Second, we have shown a wide applicability of our approach
from complete to incomplete-information environments while the approach has been proved to be
powerful in the context of complete information and a question has been raised in a recent survey
[39] whether the framework in [21] could be extended to incomplete-information settings.
The use of duality to study the PoA have been previously considered by Nadav and Roughgarden
[29] and Bilo [6]. Both paper follows the same approach which is different to ours. Roughly speaking,
given a game they consider corresponding natural formulations and incorporate the equilibrium
constraint directly to the primal. This approach surfers the integrality-gap issue when one considers
pure Nash equilibria and the objectives are non-linear or non-convex.
For the problems studied in the paper, we systematically strengthen natural LPs by the con-
struction of the new configuration LPs presented in [26]. Makarychev and Sviridenko [26] propose
a scheme that consists of solving the new LPs (with exponential number of variables) and rounding
the fractional solutions to integer ones using decoupling inequalities for optimization problems.
Instead of rounding techniques, we consider primal-dual approaches which are very adequate to
studying game efficiency.
The smoothness framework has been introduced by Roughgarden [34]. This simple, elegant
framework gives tight bounds for many classes of games in complete-information settings including
the celebrated atomic congestion games (and others in [34, 5]). Similar notion, local-smoothness
[36], inspired by the smooth argument has been used to study the PoA of splittable games in which
players can split their flow to arbitrarily small amounts and route the amount in different manner.
The local-smoothness is also powerful. It has been used to settle the PoA for a large class of cost
functions in splittable games [36] and in opinion formation games [4].
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The smoothness framework has been extended to incomplete-information environments by
Roughgarden [35], Syrgkanis and Tardos [41]. It has successfully yielded tight worst-case bounds
for the equilibria of several widely-used auction formats. We strongly recommend the reader to a
very recent survey [39] for the applications of smoothness framework in incomplete-information set-
tings. However, the smoothness argument has its limit in analyzing some auctions. As mentioned
earlier, the most illustrative examples are the simultaneous first and second price auctions where
players’ valuations are subadditive. Feldman et al. [14] have proved that the PoA is constant while
the smooth argument gives only logarithmic guarantees. An interesting open direction, as raised
in [39], is to develop new approaches beyond the smoothness framework.
Linear programming (and mathematical programming in general) has been a powerful tool in
the development of game theory. There is a vast literature on this subject and we can only mention
the most closely related to the paper. One of the most interesting recent treatments on the role
of linear programming in game theory is the book [43]. Vohra [43] revisited fundamental results in
mechanism design in an elegant manner by the means of linear programming and its duality. It is
surprising to see that many results have been shaped nicely by LPs.
1.4 Organization of Paper
In Section 2, we revisit smooth games. In Section 3, we consider congestion games. In Section 4,
we study the problem of welfare maximization in Bayesian setting. The models, definitions and
related work are given in the beginning of each (sub-)section.
2 Smooth Games under the Lens of Duality
In this section, we consider smooth games [34] in the point of view of configuration LPs and duality.
In a game, each player i selects a strategy si from a set Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and that forms a strategy
profile s = (s1, . . . , sn). The cost Ci(s) of player i is a function of the strategy profile s — the
chosen strategies of all players. A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s such that no player
can decrease its cost via a unilateral deviation; that is, for every player i and every strategy s′i ∈ Si,
Ci(s) ≤ Ci(s
′
i, s−i)
where s−i denotes the strategies chosen by all players other than i in s. The notion of Nash
equilibrium is extended to the following more general equilibrium concepts.
A mixed Nash equilibrium [30] of a game is a product distribution σ = σ1 × . . . × σn where σi
is a probability distribution over the strategy set of player i such that no player can decrease its
expected cost under σ via a unilateral deviation:
Es∼σ[Ci(s)] ≤ Es−i∼σ−i [Ci(s
′
i, s−i)]
for every i and s′i ∈ Si, where σ−i is the product distribution of all σi′ ’s other than σi.
A correlated equilibrium [1] of a game is a joint probability distribution σ over the strategy
profile of the game such that
Es∼σ[Ci(s)|si] ≤ Es∼σ[Ci(s
′
i, s−i)|si]
for every i and si, s
′
i ∈ Si.
Finally, a coarse correlated equilibrium [28] of a game is a joint probability distribution σ over
the strategy profile of the game such that
Es∼σ[Ci(s)] ≤ Es∼σ[Ci(s
′
i, s−i)]
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for every i and s′i ∈ Si.
These notions of equilibria are presented in the order from the least to the most general ones
and a notion captures the previous one as a strict subset.
The notion of smooth games and robust price of anarchy are given in [34]. A game with a joint
cost objective function C(s) =
∑n
i=1 Ci(s) is (λ, µ)-smooth if for every two outcomes s and s
∗,
n∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) ≤ λ · C(s
∗) + µ · C(s)
The robust price of anarchy of a game G is
ρ(G) := inf
{
λ
1− µ
: the game is (λ, µ)-smooth where µ < 1
}
Theorem 1 ([34]) For every game G with robust PoA ρ(G), every coarse correlated equilibrium
σ of G and every strategy profile s∗,
Es∼σ[C(s)] ≤ ρ(G) · C(s
∗)
Until the end of the section, we revisit this theorem by our primal-dual approach.
Formulation. Given a game, we formulate the corresponding optimization problem by a config-
uration LP. Let xij be variable indicating whether player i chooses strategy sij ∈ Si. Informally,
a configuration A in the formulation is a strategy profile of the game. Formally, a configuration
A consists of pairs (i, j) such that (i, j) ∈ A means that in configuration A, xij = 1. (In other
words, in this configuration, player i selects strategy sij ∈ Si.) For every configuration A, let zA
be a variable such that zA = 1 if and only if xij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ A. Intuitively, zA = 1 if
configuration A is the outcome of the game. For each configuration A, let c(A) be the cost of the
outcome (strategy profile) corresponding to configuration A. Consider the following formulation
and the dual of its relaxation.
min
∑
A
c(A)zA
∑
j:sij∈Si
xij ≥ 1 ∀i
∑
A
zA = 1
∑
A:(i,j)∈A
zA = xij ∀i, j
xij, zA ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, A
max
∑
i
αi + β
αi ≤ γij ∀i, j
β +
∑
(i,j)∈A
γij ≤ c(A) ∀A
αi ≥ 0 ∀i
In the formulation, the first constraint ensures that a player i chooses a strategy sij ∈ Si. The sec-
ond constraint means that there must be an outcome of the game. The third constraint guarantees
that if a player i selects some strategy sij then the outcome configuration A must contain (i, j).
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Construction of dual variables. Assuming that the game is (λ, µ)-smooth. Fix the parameters
λ and µ. Given a (arbitrary) coarse correlated equilibrium σ, define dual variables as follows:
αi :=
1
λ
Es∼σ[Ci(s)], β := −
µ
λ
Es∼σ[C(s)], γij :=
1
λ
Es∼σ[Ci(sij , s−i)].
Informally, up to some constant factors depending on λ and µ, αi is the cost of player i in equilibrium
σ, −β stands for the cost of the game in equilibrium σ and γij represents the cost of player i if
player i uses strategy sij while other players i
′ 6= i follows strategies in σ. We notice that β has
negative value.
Feasibility. We show that the constructed dual variables form a feasible solution. The first
constraint follows exactly the definition of (coarse correlated) equilibrium. The second constraint
is exactly the smoothness definition. Specifically, let s∗ be the strategy profile corresponding to
configuration A. Note that Es∼σ[Ci(s
∗)] = Ci(s
∗). The dual constraint reads
−
µ
λ
Es∼σ[C(s)] +
∑
i
1
λ
Es∼σ[Ci(s
∗
i , s−i)] ≤ Es∼σ[Ci(s
∗)]
which is the definition of (λ, µ)-smoothness by arranging the terms and removing the expectation.
Price of Anarchy. By weak duality, the optimal cost among all outcomes of the problem (strat-
egy profiles of the game) is at least the dual objective of the constructed dual variables. Hence, in
order to bound the PoA, we will bound the ratio between the cost of an (arbitrary) equilibrium σ
and the dual objective of the corresponding dual variables. The cost of equilibrium σ is Es∼σ[C(s)]
while the dual objective of the constructed dual variables is
n∑
i=1
1
λ
Es∼σ[Ci(s)]−
µ
λ
Es∼σ[C(s)] =
1− µ
λ
Es∼σ[C(s)]
Therefore, for a (λ, µ)-smooth game, the PoA is at most λ/(1 − µ).
Remark. Having shown in [34], Theorem 1 applies also to outcome sequences generated by
repeated play such as vanishing average regret. By the same duality approach, we can also recover
this result (by setting dual variables related to the average cost during the play).
3 Congestion Games
3.1 Atomic Congestion Games
Model. Atomic congestion games were defined by Rosenthal [32]. In this section, we consider
atomic weighted congestion games, a generalized version of the standard congestion game. In a
game, we are given a ground set E of resources, a set of n players with strategy sets S1, . . . ,Sn ⊆ 2
E
and weights w1, . . . , wn and a cost function ℓe : R
+ → R+ for each resource e ∈ E. Note that the
weighted setting generalizes the standard congestion games in which wi = 1 for all players i. Given
a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) where si ∈ Si for each player i, we say that we(s) =
∑
i:e∈si
wi
is the load induced on e by s. The cost of a player i is defined as Ci(s) =
∑
e:e∈si
wi · ℓe(we)
where we is the load on resource e induced by profile s. The total cost of the game in profile s is
C(s) =
∑n
i=1Ci(s) =
∑
e:e∈si
we(s) · ℓe
(
we(s)
)
.
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The PoA of atomic congestion games has been a extensively studied topic in algorithmic game
theory. Most notably, Roughgarden [34] proved that the smoothness argument gave tight bounds
for (unweighted) atomic congestion games. For the weighted setting, Bhawalkar et al. [5] showed
that the smoothness framework also gave tight bounds for large classes of congestion games.
In this section, we reprove the upper bound [34, 5] on the PoA in atomic congestion games. The
result is proved by the same duality approach described in Section 2, but we keep representing here
for the following purposes. First, we give a slightly different formulation of the configuration LP.
To establish smoothness, all current proofs are based on smooth-inequalities related to resources.
The new formulation is given to capture the smooth-inequality notion on resources. Second, the
new proof will be used later to show that in term of PoA, the atomic congestion games have a
strong connection with non-atomic and splittable congestion games under the viewpoint of duality.
We say that a cost function ℓe : R
+ → R+ for a resource e is (λ, µ)-resource-smooth if for every
sequences of non-negative real numbers (ai)
n
i=1 and (bi)
n
i=1, it holds that
n∑
i=1
ℓe
( i∑
j=1
aj + bi
)
≤ λ · ℓe
( n∑
i=1
bi
)
+ µ · ℓe
( n∑
i=1
ai
)
Theorem 2 ([34, 5]) Let L be a non-empty set of cost functions. The PoA of every coarse cor-
related equilibrium of every (weighted) atomic congestion game with cost functions ℓe ∈ L is at
most
inf
{
λ
1− µ
: ℓe is (λ, µ)-resource-smooth where µ < 1 ∀e ∈ E
}
Proof
Formulation. Let xij be variable indicating whether player i chooses strategy sij ∈ Si. For every
resource e, let zeT be a variable such that zeT = 1 if and only if every player i ∈ T uses resource
e, i.e., e ∈ si, and player i /∈ T does not use resource e. Denote w(T ) =
∑
i∈T wi. Consider the
following integer program and its dual. In the primal, the first constraint says that a player i has to
select a strategy sij ∈ Si. The second constraint means that a subset of players T will use resource
e. The third constraint guarantees that if a player i chooses some strategy sij ∈ Si containing
resource e then there must be a subset of players T such that i ∈ T and zeT = 1.
min
∑
e
w(T )ℓe(w(T ))zeT
∑
j
xij ≥ 1 ∀i
∑
T
zeT = 1 ∀e
∑
T :i∈T
zeT =
∑
j:e∈sij
xij ∀i, e
xij , zeT ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, e, T
max
∑
i
αi +
∑
e
βe
αi ≤
∑
e:e∈sij
γi,e ∀i, j
βe +
∑
i∈T
γi,e ≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T )) ∀e, T
αi ≥ 0 ∀i
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Dual Variables. Fix parameters λ and µ. Given a coarse correlated equilibrium σ, define cor-
responding dual variables as follows.
αi =
1
λ
Es∼σ[Ci(s)], βe := −
µ
λ
Es∼σ
[∑
i:e∈si
wiℓe(we(s))
]
, γi,e =
1
λ
Es∼σ
[
wi · ℓe
(
we(s−i) + wi
)]
where we(s−i) =
∑
i′ 6=i,e∈si′
wi′ . Informally, up to some constant factors, αi is the cost of player
i in equilibrium σ, −βe stands for the total cost of players on resource e in this equilibrium and
γi,e represents the cost of player i on resource e if player i uses strategy containing e while other
players i′ follows strategy si′ for all i
′ 6= i.
Feasibility. By this definition of dual variables, the first dual constraint follows from the definition
of coarse correlated equilibrium. The second dual constraint is satisfied due to the smoothness
definition. Specifically, the constraint for a resource e and a subset of players T reads
−Es∼σ
[
µ
λ
we(s)ℓe
(
we(s)
)]
+ Es∼σ
[
1
λ
∑
i∈T
wiℓe
(
we(s−i) + wi
)]
≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T ))
The inequality holds since without expectation and by linearity of expectation (and also Es∼σ
[
w(T )
· ℓe(w(T ))
]
= w(T )ℓe(w(T ))), it is exactly the smoothness definition.
Bounding primal and dual. The PoA is bounded by the ratio between the primal objective
and the dual one. Note that
∑
i αi =
∑
i
1
λ
Es∼σ[Ci(s)] = Es∼σ
[
1
λ
∑
ewe(s)ℓe(we(s))
]
. Therefore,
∑
i
αi +
∑
e
βe =
1− µ
λ
∑
e
we(s)ℓe(we(s))
Hence, PoA ≤ λ/(1− µ). 
3.2 Nonatomic Congestion Games
Model. Non-atomic congestion games were defined by Roughgarden and Tardos [38], motivated
by the non-atomic routing games of Wardrop [44] and Beckmann et al. [2] and the congestion
games of Rosenthal [32]. We consider a discrete version of non-atomic congestion games. The main
purpose of restricting to discrete settings is that we can use tools from linear programming. The
continuous settings can be done by considering successively finer discrete spaces.
Fix a constant ǫ (arbitrarily small). A non-atomic congestion game consists of a ground set E
of resources and n different types of players. The set of strategies of players of type i is Si and each
strategy consists of a subset of resources. Players of type i are associated to an integer number
mi that corresponds to a total amount wi := mi · ǫ. Players of type i select strategies sij ∈ Si
and distribute amounts fsij — a non-negative multiple of ǫ — to strategy sij, which lead to a
strategy distribution f = (fsij) with
∑
sij∈Si
fsij = wi = miǫ for player type i. We abuse notation
and let fe be the total amount of congestion induced on resource e by the strategy distribution f .
That is, fe :=
∑n
i=1
∑
e∈sij
fsij . Each resource has a non-decreasing cost function ℓe : R
+ → R+.
With respect to a strategy distribution f , players of type i selecting strategy sij ∈ Si incurs a cost
Csij(f) =
∑
e∈sij
ℓe(fe). A strategy distribution f is an pure equilibrium if for each player type i
and strategy sij, sij′ ∈ Si with fsij > 0,
Csij (f) ≤ Csij′ (f)
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The more general equilibrium concept such as mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria,
are defined similarly as in Section 2. The social cost of a strategy distribution f is
C(f) =
n∑
i=1
∑
sij∈Si
fsij · Csij (f) =
∑
e
fe · ℓe
(
fe
)
For non-atomic congestion games, tight bounds on the PoA for almost all classes of cost function
have been given in [38]. The core of all analyses for PoA bounds is indeed the characterization of
the unique equilibrium via a variational inequality due to Beckmann et al. [2]. This argument is
explained in [11, 10]. Moreover, the connection between smoothness arguments and PoA bounds
for non-atomic congestion games was revealed in [11].
3.2.1 Efficiency of Non-Atomic Congestion Games
In this section, we reprove the tight bound for non-atomic congestion games by the duality ap-
proach. It has been shown that in non-atomic congestion games all equilibria are essentially unique;
specifically, all coarse correlated equilibria of a non-atomic congestion game have the same cost [7].
Hence, the robust PoA is indeed the PoA of pure Nash equilibrium. However, as we do not use the
equilibrium characterization from [2], we will prove the PoA bound for coarse correlated equilibria.
Consequently, the tight PoA bound can be proved for non-regret sequences and short best-reponse
sequences. Moreover, we avoid the standard assumptions on the cost functions: xℓe(x) is convex
and ℓe(x) is differentiable.
Let L be a non-empty set of cost functions. The Pigou bound ξ(L) for L is defined as
ξ(L) := sup
ℓ∈L
sup
u,v
u · ℓ(u)
v · ℓ(v) + (u− v) · ℓ(u)
Theorem 3 ([38]) Let L be a set of cost functions. Then, for every splittable congestion game G
with cost functions in L, the price of anarchy of G is at most ξ(L).
Proof
Formulation. Denote a finite set of multiples of ǫ as {a0, a1, . . . , am} where ak = k · ǫ and
m = maxni=1mi. We say that T is a configuration of a resource e if T consists of couples (i, k)
that specifies player type i distributes an amount ak to a strategy sij ∈ Si where e ∈ sij . Note
that in a configuration T of a resource e, there might be multiple couples (i, k) ∈ T and (i, k′) ∈ T
corresponding to players of the same type. It simply means that players of type i distribute the
amounts ak and ak′ to some strategies sij and sij′ respectively that contains resource e, i.e., e ∈ sij
and e ∈ sij′. Intuitively, a configuration of a resource is a strategy distribution of a game restricted
on the resource.
Let xijk be variable indicating whether player type i distributes an amount ak to strategy
sij ∈ Si. For every resource e and a configuration T , let zeT be a variable such that zeT = 1 if and
only if players type i distributes ak to some strategy containing resource e for (i, k) ∈ T . In other
words, zeT = 1 if and only if for (i, k) ∈ T , xijk = 1 for some sij ∈ Si such that e ∈ sij . For a
configuration T of a resource e, let w(T ) be the total amount distributed by players on resource e
in this configuration. Consider the following configuration integer program and its dual.
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min
∑
e
w(T )ℓe(w(T ))zeT
∑
j,k
akxijk ≥ wi ∀i
∑
T
zeT = 1 ∀e
∑
T :(i,k)∈T
zeT =
∑
j:e∈sij
xijk ∀(i, k), e
xijk, zeT ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, e, T
max
∑
i
wiαi +
∑
e
βe
akαi ≤
∑
e:e∈sij
γi,k,e ∀i, k, j
βe +
∑
(i,k)∈T
γi,k,e ≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T )) ∀e, T
αi ≥ 0 ∀i
In the primal, the first constraint ensures that players of type i distribute the total amount
wi among its strategies. The second constraint means that a resource e is always associated to a
configuration (possibly empty). The third constraint guarantees that if player type i distributes an
amount ak to some strategy sij containing resource e then there must be a configuration T such
that (i, k) ∈ T and zeT = 1.
Dual Variables. Given a coarse correlated equilibrium σ, define the corresponding dual variables
as follows.
αi := Ef∼σ
[∑
e∈sij
ℓe(fe)
]
for some sij ∈ Si : fsij > 0,
γi,k,e := Ef∼σ
[
ak · ℓe(fe)
]
,
βe := inf
T
{
w(T )ℓe
(
w(T )
)
− Ef∼σ
[ ∑
(i,k)∈T
ak · ℓe(fe)
]}
The dual variables have similar interpretations as previous analysis. Variable αi is the total cost
of resources in a strategy used by player type i in equilibrium σ and γi,k,e represents an estimation
of the cost of player i on resource e if player type i distributes an amount ak in some strategy
containing e while other players i′ follows their strategies in σ.
Feasibility. By this definition of dual variables, the first dual constraint holds since it is the
definition of coarse correlated equilibrium. The second dual constraint for a resource e and a
configuration T reads
βe +
∑
(i,k)∈T
Ef∼σ
[
ak · ℓe(fe)
]
≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T ))
This inequality follows directly from the definition of β-variables and linearity of expectation.
Bounding primal and dual. For each resource e, let ve be the amount in T corresponding the
infimum in the definition of βe. (As we consider discrete and finite settings, the infimum is indeed
an minimum.) The dual objective is
∑
i
wiαi +
∑
e
βe = Ef∼σ
[∑
e
(
feℓe(fe) + veℓe(ve)− veℓe(fe)
)]
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where in the equalities, we use the definition of dual variables. Note that the term
(
feℓe(fe) +
veℓe(ve)− veℓe(fe)
)
≥ 0 for every resource e. Specifically, since ℓe is non-decreasing, if fe ≥ ve then
feℓe(fe) ≥ veℓe(fe); else veℓe(ve) ≥ veℓe(fe).
Besides, the primal objective is Ef∼σ
[∑
e feℓe(fe)
]
. Hence, the ratio between primal and dual
is at most
max
e
feℓ(fe)
veℓe(ve) + (fe − ve)ℓe(fe)
which is bounded by ξ(L) where L is the class of cost functions on resources in the game. 
Remark. The proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are essentially the same. By the duality
approach as a unifying tool, the main difference in term of equilibrium efficiency between atomic
and non-atomic congestion games is due to the definition of player cost. In the context of large
games [15], while the weight of a player is negligible then the player cost in a atomic congestion
game coincides with the one in the corresponding non-atomic congestion game. In this context, the
PoA in atomic congestion game tends to that in non-atomic setting.
3.2.2 Resource Augmentation in Non-Atomic Congestion Games
Roughgarden and Tardos [37] proved that in every non-atomic selfish routing game, the cost of an
equilibrium is upper bounded by that of an optimal solution that routes twice as much traffic. In this
section, we recover this result by the mean of linear programming duality. Resource augmentation
have been widely studied in many contexts in algorithms. Recently, Lucarelli et al. [24] have
presented an unified approach to study resource augmentation in online (scheduling) problems
based on primal-dual techniques. We will follow this framework to prove the resource augmentation
result in non-atomic congestion games.
Let (G, (1 + r)w, ℓ) for some constant r be a non-atomic congestion game in which the total
amount for players of type i is (1 + r)wi and the cost function on each resource e is ℓe. Our
purpose is to bound the cost of an arbitrary equilibrium in (G,w, ℓ) by that of an optimal solution
in (G, (1 + r)w, ℓ) for some r > 0. Consider the following formulation (similar to the previous
section) (Pr) for (G, (1 + r)w, ℓ). By weak duality, the optimal cost in (G, (1 + r)w, ℓ) is at least
the objective of a dual feasible solution in (Dr).
min
∑
e
w(T )ℓe(w(T ))zeT (Pr)
∑
j,k
akxijk ≥ (1 + r) · wi ∀i
∑
T
zeT = 1 ∀e
∑
T :(i,k)∈T
zeT =
∑
j:e∈sij
xijk ∀(i, k), e
xijk, zeT ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, e, T
max
∑
i
(1 + r)wiαi +
∑
e
βe (Dr)
akαi ≤
∑
e:e∈sij
γi,k,e ∀i, k, j
βe +
∑
(i,k)∈T
γi,k,e ≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T )) ∀e, T
αi ≥ 0 ∀i
Hence, our scheme consists of bounding the cost of an arbitrary equilibrium in (G,w, ℓ) and the
objective (Dr) of an appropriate dual feasible solution.
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Theorem 4 In every non-atomic congestion game, for any constant r > 0, the cost of an equilib-
rium in (G,w, ℓ) is at most 1/r times that of an optimal solution in (G, (1 + r)w, ℓ).
Proof Given a coarse correlated equilibrium σ of the game where the amount for players of type
i is wi. Construct the dual feasible solution for (Dr) as in the proof of Theorem 3. As the dual
constraints of (Dr) and (D0) are the same, the construction in the proof of Theorem 3 gives a dual
feasible solution for (Dr). It remains to bound the objective of (Dr) of this dual solution to the
cost of equilibrium σ, which is Ef∼σ [
∑
e feℓe(fe)]. The former is
∑
i
(1 + r)wiαi +
∑
e
βe = Ef∼σ
[∑
e
(
(1 + r) · feℓe(fe) + veℓe(ve)− veℓe(fe)
)]
≥ Ef∼σ
[∑
e
r · feℓe(fe)
]
where the inequality holds since feℓe(fe)+ veℓe(ve) ≥ veℓe(fe). Precisely, if fe ≥ ve then feℓe(fe) ≥
veℓe(fe) and if fe < ve then veℓe(ve) > veℓe(fe) (since ℓe in non-decreasing). Hence, we deduce that
the objective of (Dr) is at least r times the cost of equilibrium σ. 
3.3 Splittable Congestion Games
Model. In this section we consider the splittable congestion games also in discrete setting. Fix
a constant ǫ > 0 (arbitrarily small). In a splittable congestion game, there is a set E of resources,
each resource is associated to a non-decreasing differentiable cost function ℓe : R
+ → R+ such that
xℓe(x) is convex. There are n players, a player i has a set of strategies Si and has weight wi,
a multiple of ǫ. A strategy of player i is a distribution ui of its weight wi among strategies sij
in Si such that
∑
sij∈Si
uisij = wi and u
i
sij
≥ 0 is a multiple of ǫ. A strategy profile is a vector
u = (u1, . . . , un) of all players’ strategies. We abuse notation and define uie =
∑
e∈sij
uisij as the
load player i distributes on resource e and ue =
∑n
i=1 u
i
e the total load on e. Given a strategy
profile u, the cost of player i is defined as Ci(u) :=
∑
e u
i
e · ℓe(ue). A strategy profile u is a pure
Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player i and all sij, sij′ ∈ Si with u
i
sij
> 0:∑
e∈sij
(
ℓe(ue) + u
i
e · ℓ
′
e(ue)
)
≤
∑
e∈sij′
(
ℓe(ue) + u
i
e · ℓ
′
e(ue)
)
The proof of this equilibrium characterization can be found in [17]. Again, the more general
concepts of mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria are defined similarly as in Section 2.
In the game, the social cost is defined as C(u) :=
∑n
i=1Ci(u) =
∑
e ueℓe(ue).
The PoA bounds has been recently established for a large class of cost functions by Roughgarden
and Schoppmann [36]. The authors proposed a local smoothness framework and showed that the
local smoothness arguments give optimal PoA bounds for a large class of cost functions in splittable
congestion games. Prior to Roughgarden and Schoppmann [36], the works of Cominetti et al. [10]
and Harks [17] have also the flavour of local smoothness though their bounds are not tight. The local
smooth arguments extends to the correlated equilibria of a game but not to the coarse correlated
equilibria. Motivating by the duality approach, we define a new notion of smoothness and prove
a bound on the PoA of coarse correlated equilibria. It turns out that this PoA bound for coarse
correlated equilibria is indeed tight for all classes of scale-invariant cost functions by the lower bound
given by Roughgarden and Schoppmann [36, Section 5]. A class of cost function L is scale-invariant
if ℓ ∈ L implies that a · ℓ(b · x) ∈ L for every a, b > 0.
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Formulation. Given a splittable congestion game, we formulate the problem by the same con-
figuration program for non-atomic congestion game. Denote a finite set of multiples of ǫ as
{a0, a1, . . . , am} where ak = k · ǫ and m = max
n
i=1wi/ǫ. We say that T is a configuration of a
resource e if T consists of couples (i, k) that specifies player i distributes an amount ak of its weight
wi to a strategy sij ∈ Si where e ∈ sij. Intuitively, a configuration of a resource is a strategy profile
of a game restricted on the resource. Let xijk be variable indicating whether player i distributes
an amount ak of its weight to strategy sij ∈ Si. For every resource e and a configuration T , let zeT
be a variable such that zeT = 1 if and only if for (i, k) ∈ T , xijk = 1 for some sij ∈ Si such that
e ∈ sij. For a configuration T on resource e, denote w(T ) the total amount distributed by players
in T on e.
min
∑
e
w(T )ℓe(w(T ))zeT
∑
j,k
akxijk ≥ wi ∀i
∑
T
zeT = 1 ∀e
∑
T :(i,k)∈T
zeT =
∑
j:e∈sij
xijk ∀(i, k), e
xij , zeT ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, e, T
max
∑
i
wiαi +
∑
e
βe
akαi ≤
∑
e:e∈sij
γi,k,e ∀i, k, j
βe +
∑
(i,k)∈T
γi,k,e ≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T )) ∀e, T
αi ≥ 0 ∀i
Again, in the primal, the first constraint says that a player i distributes the total weight wi among
its strategies. The second constraint means that a resource e is always associated to a configuration
(possibly empty). The third constraint guarantees that if a player i distributes an amount ak to
some strategy sij containing resource e then there must be a configuration T such that (i, k) ∈ T
and zeT = 1.
All previous duality proofs have the same structure: in the dual LP, the first constraint gives
the characterization of an equilibrium and the second one settles the PoA bounds. Following this
line, we give the following definition.
Definition 2 A cost function ℓ : R+ → R+ is (λ, µ)-dual-smooth if for every vectors u =
(u1, . . . , un) and v = (v1, . . . , vn),
vℓ(u) +
n∑
i=1
ui(vi − ui) · ℓ
′(u) ≤ λ · vℓ(v) + µ · uℓ(u)
where u =
∑
i ui and v =
∑
i vi. A splittable congestion game is (λ, µ)-dual-smooth if every
resource e in the game, function ℓe is (λ, µ)-dual-smooth.
Theorem 5 For every (λ, µ)-dual-smooth splittable congestion game G, the price of anarchy of
coarse correlated equilibria of G is at most λ/(1 − µ). This bound is tight for the class of scalable
cost functions.
Proof The proof follows the duality scheme.
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Dual Variables. Fix parameter λ and µ. Given a coarse correlated equilibrium σ, define corre-
sponding dual variables as follows.
αi =
1
λ
Eu∼σ
[∑
e∈sij
ℓe(ue) + u
i
eℓ
′
e(ue)
]
for some sij ∈ Si : u
i
sij
> 0,
βe = −
1
λ
Eu∼σ
[
µ · ueℓe(ue) +
∑
i
(uie)
2 · ℓ′e(ue)
]
,
γi,k,e =
1
λ
Eu∼σ
[
ak
(
ℓe(ue) + u
i
eℓ
′
e(ue)
)]
.
The dual variables have similar interpretations as previous analysis. Up to some constant factors,
variable αi is the marginal cost of a strategy used by player i in the equilibrium; and γi,k,e represents
an estimation of the cost of player i on resource e if player i distributes an amount ak of its weight
to some strategy containing e while players i′ other than i follows their strategies in the equilibrium.
Feasibility. By this definition of dual variables, the first dual constraint holds since it is the
definition of coarse correlated equilibrium. Rearranging the terms, the second dual constraint for
a resource e and a configuration T reads
1
λ
∑
(i,k)∈T
Eu∼σ
[
ak · ℓe(ue) + u
i
e(ak − u
i
e)ℓ
′
e(ue)
)]
≤ w(T )ℓe(w(T )) +
µ
λ
Eu∼σ
[
ueℓe(ue)
]
This inequality follows directly from the definition of (λ, µ)-dual-smoothness and linearity of ex-
pectation (and note that w(T )ℓe(w(T )) = Eu∼σ
[
w(T )ℓe(w(T ))
]
and w(T ) =
∑
(i,k)∈T ak).
Bounding primal and dual. By the definition of dual variables, the dual objective is
∑
i
wiαi +
∑
e
βe =
∑
e
(∑
i
uieαi + βe
)
=
1
λ
Eu∼σ
[∑
e
ueℓe(ue) +
∑
i
(uie)
2 · ℓ′e(ue)
]
−
1
λ
Eu∼σ
[
µ · ueℓe(ue) +
∑
i
(uie)
2 · ℓ′e(ue)
]
=
1− µ
λ
Eu∼σ
[∑
e
ueℓe(ue)
]
while the cost of the equilibrium σ is Eu∼σ
[∑
e ueℓe(ue)
]
. The theorem follows. 
4 Efficiency in Welfare Maximization
In a general mechanism design setting, each player i has a set of actions Ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Given an action ai ∈ Ai chosen by each player i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which lead to the action profile
a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A = A1 × . . . × An, the auctioneer decides an outcome o(a) among the set
of feasible outcomes O. Each player i has a valuation (or type) vi taking values in a parameter
space Vi. For each outcome o ∈ O, player i has utility ui(o, vi) depending on the outcome of the
game and its valuation vi. Since the outcome o(a) of the game is determined by the action profile
a, the utility of a player i is denoted as ui(a; vi). We are interested in auctions that in general
consist of an allocation rule and a payment rule. Given an action profile a = (a1, . . . , an), the
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auctioneer decides an allocation and a payment pi(a) for each player i. Then, the utility of player
i with valuation vi, following the quasi-linear utility model, is defined as ui(a; vi) = vi−pi(a). The
social welfare of an auction is defined as the total utility of all participants (the players and the
auctioneer): Sw(a;v) =
∑n
i=1 ui(a; vi) +
∑n
i=1 pi(a).
In the paper, we consider incomplete-information settings. In the settings, the valuation vi of
each player is a private information and is drawn independently from a publicly known distribution
F with density function f . Let ∆(Ai) be the set of probability distributions over the actions in
Ai. A strategy of a player is a mapping σi : Vi → ∆(Ai) from a valuation vi ∈ Vi to a distribution
over actions σi(vi) ∈ ∆(Ai).
Definition 3 (Bayes-Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium (BNE) if for every player i, for every valuation vi ∈ Vi, and for every action a
′
i ∈ Ai:
Ev−i∼F−i(vi)
[
Ea∼σ(v) [ui(a; vi)]
]
≥ Ev−i∼F−i(vi)
[
Ea−i∼σ−i(v−i)
[
ui(a
′
i,a−i; vi)
]]
For a vector w, we use w−i to denote the vector w with the i-th component removed. Besides,
F−i(vi) stands for the probability distribution over all players other than i conditioned on the
valuation vi of player i.
The price of anarchy of Bayes-Nash equilibria of an auction is defined as
inf
F ,σ
Ev∼F
[
Ea∼σ(v)[Sw(a;v)]
]
Ev∼F
[
Opt(v)
]
where the infimum is taken over Bayes-Nash equilibria σ and Opt(v) is the optimal welfare with
valuation profile v.
In the paper, we consider discrete settings of valuations and payments, i.e., there are only a
finite (large) number of possible valuations and payments. The main purpose of restricting to
discrete settings is that we can use tools from linear programming. The continuous settings can be
done by considering successively finer discrete spaces.
4.1 Smooth Auctions
In this section, we show that the primal-dual approach also captures the smoothness framework
in studying the inefficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria in incomplete-information settings. Smooth
auctions have been defined by Roughgarden [35] and Syrgkanis and Tardos [41]. The definitions
are slightly different but both are inspired by the original smoothness argument [34] and all known
smoothness-based proofs can be equivalently analyzed by one of these definitions. In this section,
we consider the definition of smooth auctions in [35] and revisit the price of anarchy bound of
smooth auctions. In the end of the section, we show that a similar proof carries through the
smooth auctions defined by Syrgkanis and Tardos [41].
Definition 4 ([35]) For parameters λ, µ ≥ 0, an auction is (λ, µ)-smooth if for every valuation
profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), there exists action distribution D
∗
1(v), . . . ,D
∗
n(v) over A1, . . . ,An such
that, for every action profile a,∑
i
Ea∗
i
∼D∗
i
(v)
[
ui(a
∗
i ,a−i; vi)
]
≥ λ · Sw(a∗;v)− µ · Sw(a;v) (1)
Theorem 6 ([35]) If an auction is (λ, µ)-smooth and the distributions of player valuations are
independent then every Bayes-Nash equilibrium has expected welfare at least λ1+µ times the optimal
expected welfare.
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Proof Given an auction, we formulate the corresponding optimization problem by a configuration
LP. A configuration A consists of pairs (i, ai) such that (i, ai) ∈ A means that in configuration A,
player i chooses action ai. Intuitively, a configuration is an action profile of players. For every
player i, every valuation vi ∈ Vi and every action ai ∈ Ai, let xi,ai(vi) be the variable representing
the probability that player i chooses action ai. Besides, for every valuation profile v, let zA(v)
be the variable indicating the probability that the chosen configuration (action profile) is A. For
each configuration A and valuation profile v, the auctioneer outcomes an allocation and a payment
and that results in a social welfare denoted as cA(v). In the other words, if a is the action
profile corresponding to the configuration A then cA(v) is in fact Sw(a;v). Consider the following
formulation and its dual.
max
∑
v
cA(v)zA(v)
∑
ai∈Ai
xi,ai(vi) ≤ fi(vi) ∀i, vi
∑
A
zA(v) ≤ f(v) ∀v
∑
A:(i,ai)∈A
zA(vi,v−i) ≤ f−i(v−i) · xi,ai(vi)
∀i, ai, vi,v−i
xi,ai(vi), zA(v) ≥ 0 ∀i, ai, A, vi,v
min
∑
i,vi
fi(vi) · αi(vi)+
∑
v
f(v) · β(v)
αi(vi) ≥
∑
v−i
f−i(v−i) · γi,ai(vi,v−i) ∀i, ai, vi
β(v) +
∑
(i,ai)∈A
γi,ai(v) ≥ cA(v) ∀A,v
αi(vi), β(v), γi,ai (v) ≥ 0 ∀i, vi,v
In the primal, the first and second constraints guarantee that variables x and z represent indeed the
probability distribution of each player and the joint distribution, respectively. The third constraint
makes the connection between variables x and z. It ensures that if a player i with valuation vi
selects some action ai then in the valuation profile (vi,v−i), the probability that the configuration
A contains (i, ai) must be f−i(v−i) · xi,ai(vi). The primal objective is the expected welfare of the
auction.
Construction of dual variables. Assuming that the auction is (λ, µ)-smooth. Fix the param-
eters λ and µ. Given an arbitrary Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ, define dual variables as follows.
αi(vi) :=
1
λ
Ev−i
[
Eb∼σ(vi,v−i)[ui(b; vi)]
]
,
β(v) :=
µ
λ
Eb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(b;v)
]
,
γi,ai(v) :=
1
λ
Eb−i∼σ−i(v−i)[ui(ai, b−i; vi)].
Informally, up to some constant factors depending on λ and µ, αi(vi) is the expected utility of
player i in equilibrium σ; β(v) stands for the social welfare of the auction where the valuation
profile is v and players follow the equilibrium actions σ(v); and γi,ai(v) represents the utility of
player i in valuation profile v if player i chooses action ai while other players i
′ 6= i follows their
equilibrium strategies σ−i(v−i).
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Feasibility. We show that the constructed dual variables form a feasible solution. By the defini-
tion of dual variables, the first dual constraint reads
1
λ
Ev−i
[
Eb∼σ(v)[ui(b; vi)]
]
≥
1
λ
∑
v−i
f−i(v−i) · Eb−i∼σ−i(v−i)[ui(ai, b−i; vi)]
=
1
λ
Ev−i
[
Eb−i∼σ−i(v−i)[ui(ai, b−i; vi)]
]
This is exactly the definition that σ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
For every valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) and for any configuration A (corresponding action
profile a = (a1, . . . , an)), the second constraint reads:
µ
λ
Eb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(b;v)
]
+
∑
(i,ai)∈A
1
λ
Eb−i∼σ−i(v−i)[ui(ai, b−i; vi)] ≥ Sw(a;v). (2)
Note that we can write Sw(a;v) = Eb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(a;v)
]
. For any fixed realization b of σ(v), by
(λ, µ)-smoothness
µ
λ
Sw(b;v) +
∑
i
1
λ
ui(ai, b−i; vi) ≥ Sw(a;v).
Hence, by taking expectation over σ(v), Inequality (2) follows.
Price of Anarchy. The welfare of equilibrium σ is EvEb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(b;v)
]
while the dual objective
of the constructed dual variables is∑
i,vi
fi(vi) ·
1
λ
Ev−i
[
Eb∼σ(v)[ui(b; vi)]
]
+
∑
v
f(v) ·
µ
λ
Eb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(b;v)
]
≤
1 + µ
λ
· EvEb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(b;v)
]
Therefore, the PoA of a (λ, µ)-smooth auction is at most λ/(1 + µ). 
Remark. The notion of (λ, µ)-smooth auctions due to Syrgkanis and Tardos [41] is defined sim-
ilarly as Definition 4 but now the parameter µ ≥ 1 and Inequality (1) is replaced by the following
inequality: ∑
i
Ea∗
i
∼D∗
i
(v)
[
ui(a
∗
i ,a−i; vi)
]
≥ λ ·Opt(v)− µ ·R(a) (3)
where R(a) is the total payment of players if the action profile is a. Note that, in order to bound
the price of anarchy, Inequality (3) can be replaced by a weaker one, which is:∑
i
Ea∗
i
∼D∗
i
(v)
[
ui(a
∗
i ,a−i; vi)
]
≥ λ · Sw(a∗;v)− µ ·R(a) (4)
Using the same proof structure of Theorem 6, we can prove that the price of anarchy is at most
λ/µ [41]. Specifically, define dual variables α and γ as previous and
β(v) =
µ
λ
Eb∼σ(v)
[
R(b)
]
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The feasibility follows the definitions of Bayes-Nash equilibria and smooth auctions, in particular
Inequality (4). To bound the price of anarchy, as µ ≥ 1, we have∑
i,vi
fi(vi) ·
1
λ
Ev−i
[
Eb∼σ(v)[ui(b; vi)]
]
+
∑
v
f(v) ·
µ
λ
Eb∼σ(v)
[
R(b)
]
≤
µ
λ
· EvEb∼σ(v)
[
Sw(b;v)
]
Therefore, the price of anarchy is at most λ/µ.
4.2 Simultaneous Item-Bidding Auctions
Model. In this section, we consider the following Bayesian combinatorial auctions. In the setting,
there arem items to be sold to n players. Each player i has a private monotone valuation vi : 2
[m] →
R
+ over different subsets of items S ⊂ 2[m]. For simplicity, we denote vi(S) as viS . The valuation
profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) is drawn from a product distribution F . In other words, the probability
distributions Fi of valuations vi are independent. Designing efficient combinatorial auctions are in
general complex and a major direction in literature is to seek simple and efficient auctions in term
of PoA. Among others, simultaneous item-bidding auctions are of particular interest.
We consider two forms of simultaneous item-bidding auctions: simultaneous first-price auctions
(S1A) and simultaneous second-price auctions (S2A). In the auctions, each player submits simul-
taneously a vector of bids, one for each item. A typical assumption is non-overbidding property in
which each player submits a vector bi of bids such that for any set of items S,
∑
j∈S bij ≤ viS . Given
the bid profile, each item is allocated to the player with highest bid. In a simultaneous first-price
auction, the payment of the winner of each item is its bid on the item; while in a simultaneous
second-price auction, the winner of each item pays the second highest bid on the item.
4.2.1 Connection between Primal-Dual and Non-Smooth Techniques
In this section, we consider the setting in which all player valuations are sub-additive. That is,
vi(S∪T ) ≤ vi(S)+vi(T ) for every player i and every subsets S, T ⊂ 2
[m]. The PoA of simultaneous
item-bidding auctions has been widely studied in this setting. Using smoothness framework in
auctions, logarithmic bounds on PoA for S1A and S2A are given by Hassidim et al. [18] and
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [3], respectively. Recently, Feldman et al. [14] presented a significant
improvement by establishing the PoA bounds 2 and 4 for S1A and S2A, respectively. Their proof
arguments go beyond the smoothness framework. In the following, we revisit the results of Feldman
et al. [14] and show that the duality approach captures the non-smooth technique in [14].
Formulation. Given a valuation profile v, let xij(v) be the variable indicating whether player i
receives item j in valuation profile v. Let ziS(v) be the variable indicating whether player i receives
a set of items S. Then for any profile v and for any item j,
∑
i xij(v) ≤ 1, meaning that an item
j is allocated to at most one player. Moreover,
∑
S:j∈S ziS(v) = xij(v), meaning that if player i
receives item j then some subset of items S allocated to i must contain j. Besides,
∑
S ziS(v) = 1
since some subset of items (possibly empty) is allocated to i.
Let xij(vi) and ziS(vi) be interim variables corresponding to xij(v) and ziS(v) and are defined
as follows:
xij(vi) := Ev−i∼F−i
[
xij(vi,v−i)
]
, ziS(vi) := Ev−i∼F−i
[
ziS(vi,v−i)
]
where F−i is the product distribution of all players other than i. Consider the following relaxation
with interim variables and its dual. The constraints in the primal follow the relationship between
the interim variables xij(vi), ziS(vi) and variables xij(v), ziS(v).
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max
∑
i,S
∑
vi
fi(vi)
[
viS · ziS(vi)
]
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
fi(vi)xij(vi) ≤ 1 ∀j
∑
S
ziS(vi) = 1 ∀i, vi
∑
S:j∈S
ziS(vi) = xij(vi) ∀i, j, vi
xij(vi), ziS(vi) ≥ 0 ∀i, j, S, vi
min
∑
i,vi
αi(vi) +
∑
j
βj
fi(vi) · βj ≥ γi,j(vi) ∀i, j, vi
αi(vi) +
∑
j∈S
γi,j(vi) ≥ fi(vi) · viS ∀i, S, vi
αi(vi) ≥ 0 ∀i, vi
Dual Variables. Fix a Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ. Given a valuation v, denote b = (b1, . . . , bn) =
σ(v) as the bid equilibrium. Let B be the distribution of b over the randomness of v and σ. Let
B(vi) be the distribution of b over the randomness of v and σ while the valuation vi of player i
is fixed. Since vi and v−i are independent and each σi is a mapping Vi → ∆(Ai), strategy bi is
independent of b−i. Let B−i be the distribution of b−i. We define dual variables as follows.
Let αi(vi) be proportional to the expected utility of player i with valuation vi, over the ran-
domness of valuations v−i of other players. Specifically,
αi(vi) := 2fi(vi) · Ev−i∼Fi
[
Eσ
[
ui
(
σ(vi,v−i), vi
)]]
= 2fi(vi) · Eb∼B(vi)
[
ui
(
b, vi
)]
Besides, let γi,j(vi) be proportional to the expected value of the bid on item j if player i with
valuation vi want to win item j while other players follow the equilibrium strategies. Formally,
γi,j(vi) := 2fi(vi) · Eb−i∼B−i
[
max
k 6=i
bkj
]
Finally, define βj := 2maxi Eb−i∼B−i [maxk 6=i bkj].
The following lemma shows the feasibility of the variables. The main core of the proof relies on
an argument in [14].
Lemma 1 The dual vector (α, β, γ) defined above constitutes a dual feasible solution.
Proof The first dual constraint follows immediately by the definitions of dual variables β and γ.
We are now proving the second dual constraint. Fix a player i with sub-additive valuation vi and
assume that fi(vi) > 0 (otherwise, it is trivial). By [14] (or see [33, Lemma 1.3] for another clear
exposition), for any set of items S, there exists an action b∗i such that
Eb−i∼B−i
[
ui
(
(b∗i , b−i), vi
)]
+ Eb−i∼B−i
[∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj
]
≥
1
2
viS .
Moreover, the first term in the left-hand side is at most the utility of player i with valuation vi
since (bi, b−i) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
Eb∼B(vi)
[
ui
(
b, vi
)]
+ Eb∼B(vi)
[∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj
]
≥
1
2
viS
By the definition of dual variables, this inequality is exactly the second constraint by multiplying
both sides by 2fi(vi). 
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Theorem 7 ([14]) If player valuations are sub-additive then every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a
S1A (or S2A) has expected welfare at least 1/2 (or 1/4, resp) of the optimal one.
Proof For an item j, let i∗(j) ∈ argmaxi Ev−i∼F−i [maxk 6=i bkj]. Hence,
βj = 2Ev
−i∗(j)∼F−i∗(j)Eσ
[
max
k 6=i∗(j)
bkj
]
= 2Evi∗(j)∼FiEv−i∗(j)∼F−i∗(j)Eσ
[
max
k 6=i∗(j)
bkj
]
= 2Ev∼FEσ
[
max
k 6=i∗(j)
bkj
]
where the second equality is due to the fact that the term Ev
−i∗(j)∼F−i∗(j)Eσ
[
maxk 6=i∗(j) bkj
]
is
independent of vi∗(j). Therefore, the dual objective is
∑
i,vi
αi(vi) +
∑
j
βj = 2Ev∼FEσ
[∑
i
ui(b, vi) +
∑
j
max
k 6=i∗(j)
bkj
]
Fix a random choice of profile v and σ (so the bid profile b is fixed). We bound the dual objective,
i.e., the right-hand side of the above equality, in S1A and S2A. Note that the utility of a player
winning no item is 0.
First Price Auction. Partition the set of items into the winning items of each player. Consider
a player i with the set of winning items S. The utility of this player i is viS −
∑
j∈S maxk bkj.
Hence, viS −
∑
j∈S bij +
∑
j∈Smaxk 6=i∗(j) bkj ≤ viS since by the allocation rule, bij = maxk bkj for
every j ∈ S. Hence, summing over all players, the dual objective is bounded by twice the total
expected valuation of winning players, which is the primal. So the price of anarchy is at most 2.
Second Price Auction. Similarly, consider a player i with the set of winning items S. The
utility of player i as well as its payment (by no-overbidding) are at most viS . Therefore, summing
over all players, the dual objective is bounded by four times the total expected valuation of winning
players. Hence, the price of anarchy is at most 4. 
Remark. The non-overbidding assumption, a risk-aversion assumption, is given in order to pre-
vent players from suffering negative utility while receiving items. We use this assumption in the
proof only in settling the ratio between the primal and the dual; specifically to argue that the
payment of a player does not exceed its valuation on the received items. The above analysis holds
even without this assumption in the following sense. Assume that players are allowed to bid up to
a constant r times their valuation (hence, players risk to have negative utility). Then, the PoA for
S2A is 2(1 + r).
4.2.2 Connection between Primal-Dual and No-Envy Learning
Very recently, Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [12] have introduced no-envy learning — a novel concept
of learning in auctions. The notion is inspired by the concept of Walrasian equilibrium and it
is motivated by the fact that no-regret learning algorithms (which converge to coarse correlated
equilibria) for the simultaneous item-bidding auctions are computationally inefficient as the number
of player actions are exponential. When the players have fractionally sub-additive (XOS) valuation,
Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [12] showed that no-envy outcomes are a relaxation of no-regret outcomes.
Moreover, no-envy outcomes maintain the approximate welfare optimality of no-regret outcomes
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while ensuring the computational tractability. In this section, we explore the connection between
the no-envy learning and the primal-dual approach. Indeed, the notion of no-envy learning would
be naturally derived from the dual constraints very much in the same way as the smoothness
argument is.
We recall the notion of no-envy learning algorithms [12]. We first define the online learning
problem. In the online learning problem, at each step t, the player chooses a bid vector bt =
(bt1, . . . , b
t
m) where b
t
j is the bid on item j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m; and the adversary picks adaptively
(depending on the history of the play but not on the current bid bt) a threshold vector θt =
(θt1, . . . , θ
t
m). The player wins the set S
∗(bt, θt) = {j : btj ≥ θ
t
j} and gets reward:
u(bt, θt) := v
(
S∗(bt, θt)
)
−
∑
j∈S∗(bt,θt)
θtj
where v : 2[m] → R is the valuation of the player.
Definition 5 ([12]) An algorithm for the online learning problem is r-approximate no-envy if, for
any adaptively chosen sequence of (random) threshold vector θ1:T by the adversary, the (random)
bid vector b1:T chosen by the algorithm satisfies:
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
u(bt, θt)
]
≥ max
S⊂[m]
(
1
r
· v(S)−
∑
j∈S
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[
θtj
])
− ǫ(T ) (5)
where the no-envy rate ǫ(T ) → 0 while T → ∞. An algorithm is no-envy if it is 1-approximate
no-envy.
Now we show the connection between primal-dual and no-envy learning by revisiting the fol-
lowing theorem. As we will see, the notion of no-envy learning corresponds exactly to a constraint
of a dual program.
Theorem 8 ([12]) If n players in a S2A use an r-approximate no-envy learning algorithm with
envy rate ǫ(T ) then in T steps, the average welfare is at least 12rOpt − n · ǫ(T ) where Opt is the
expected optimal welfare.
Proof Let bti be the bid vector of player i where b
t
ij is the bid of player i on item j in step t. In a
S2A the threshold θtij = maxk 6=i b
t
kj. Consider the same primal and dual LPs in Section 4.2.1.
Dual variables. Recall that r is the approximation factor and ǫ(T ) the no-envy rate of the
learning algorithm. Define dual variables (similar to the ones in Section 4.2.1) as follows.
αi(vi) := r · fi(vi) · Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt(vi,v−i)
[
ui
(
bti, θ
t
i
)]]
+ r · ǫ(T )
γi,j(vi) := r · fi(vi) · Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt(vi,v−i)
[
θtij
]]
= r · fi(vi) · Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt
−i
(v−i)
[
θtij
]]
βj := r ·max
i
max
vi
Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt(vi,v−i)
[
θtij
]]
= r ·max
i
Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt
−i
(v−i)
[
θtij
]]
where the second equalities in the definitions of γ and β follow the fact that player valuations are
independent and θtij does not depend on b
t
ij for every i, j.
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Feasibility. The first dual constraint follows immediately by the definitions of dual variables β
and γ. For a fixed set S and a player i with valuation vi, the second dual constraint reads
r · fi(vi) · Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt(vi,v−i)
[
ui
(
bti, θ
t
i
)]]
+ r · ǫ(T )
+ r ·
∑
j∈S
fi(vi) · Ev−i∼Fi
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt
−i
(v−i)
[
θtij
]]
≥ fi(vi) · viS
This inequality follows immediately from the definition of r-approximate no-envy learning algo-
rithms (specifically, Inequality (5)).
Bounding the cost. In T steps, the average welfare is Ev
[
1
T
∑T
t=1 Ebt(v)
[
ui
(
bti, θ
t
i
)]]
. Besides,
∑
i,vi
αi(vi) ≤ r · Ev
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt(v)
[
vi
(
S∗(bti, θ
t
i)
)]]
+ n · r · ǫ(T ),
∑
j
βj ≤ r · Ev
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ebt(v)
[
vi
(
S∗(bti, θ
t
i)
)]]
where the last inequality is due to the non-overbidding property. Hence, the theorem follows by
weak duality. 
4.3 Sequential Auctions
4.3.1 Sequential Second Price Auctions in Sponsored Search
Model. In the sponsored search problem, there are n players and n slots. Each player i has a
private valuation vi, representing its valuation per click. We use v = (v1, . . . , vn) to denote the
valuation profile of players. Additionally, each player i has a quality factor αi that reflect the
click-ability of the ad. The couple of valuation and quality factor (vi, αi) of player i is drawn from
a publicly known distribution Fi. In the model, we assume that the distributions Fi’s are mutually
independent. The slots have associated click-through-rates β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βn. An outcome is an
one-to-one assignment of slots to players. When player i is assigned to the j-th slot, the player gets
αiβj clicks.
In the auction, the auctioneer sells slots sequentially one-by-one in non-increasing order of βj
via the second price mechanisms. At the consideration of slot j, the auctioneer collects all the
bid bij on item j from every player i , which is interpreted as a valuation declaration. We also
assume that the non-overbidding property, meaning that bij ≤ vi for all i and j. The auctioneer
then assigns slot j to the player (that has not received any slot so far) with highest effective bid,
defined as αibi. The payment of the winning player is set according to critical value: the smallest
bid that guarantees the player still gets the slot. Specifically, if a slot j is assigned to player i then
the payment of i is pi = αi′βi′/αi where αi′βi′ is the second highest effective bid on slot j. The
utility of player i is αiβj(vi − pi). The social welfare of the outcome is
∑
i,j βjαivi where the sum
is taken over all player i with their allocated slots j.
This setting is captured by extensive form games (see [16, 31] for comprehensive treatments).
The strategy of each player is an adaptive bidding policy: the bid of player i for slot j is a function
of its valuation vi, the common knowledge about the distributions of player valuations F and the
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history hj of outcomes in auctions before the consideration of slot j. Thus a player strategy can be
denoted as bij(vi, hj). We are interested in the perfect Bayesian equilibria which is a refinement of
the concepts of Bayes-Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria. A profile of bidding polices
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the original game and given an
arbitrary history (of some t first rounds), the policy profile remains also a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of this induced game.
The sponsored search problem via the generalized second-price auctions has been extensively
studied, first considered by Mehta et al. [27] from optimization perspective and was proposed
simultaneously by Edelman et al. [13] and Varian [42] from game theoretical viewpoint (see [22, 25]
for surveys on the topic). Recently, Caragiannis et al. [9] have proved the PoA bound of 2.927
(without the independence assumption on distributions Fi’s), the currently best known PoA bound,
using a technique called semi-smoothness, an extension of the smoothness framework in [34]. The
study of PoA of sequential auctions in algorithmic game theory has been initiated by Leme et al.
[23]. The authors studied sequential first price auctions for matching markets and matroid auctions
in the full-information environments and showed that the PoA (of pure Nash equilibria) is at most
2. Subsequently, Syrgkanis and Tardos [40] extended the results to incomplete-informations settings
and gave constant bounds for both auctions. Leme et al. [23], Syrgkanis and Tardos [40] proposed
a bluffing deviation, where a player pretends to play as in equilibrium, until the right moment
when the player deviates to acquire some item. This hypothetical deviation gives rise to useful
inequalities to bound the PoA.
In this section, we show an improved bound of 2 over the best-known PoA bound of 2.927 [9]. In
the analysis, the dual variables are intuitively constructed such that they correspond to the player
utilities and player payments. In order to show the feasibility of dual variables, we also use the
idea of bluffing deviations. These deviations, coupling with the assumption of equilibrium, lead
to useful inequalities which are served to prove the feasibility. The primal-dual approach indeed
enables the improvement as well as a fairly simple proof.
Formulation. For player i with valuation vi and quality factor αi, let xij(vi, αi) be a variable
indicating the interim assignment of slot j to player i. Recall that Fi is the distribution of (vi, αi).
Consider the following relaxation of the sponsored search problem and its dual. In the primal
relaxation, the first constraint says that a player receives at most one slot and the second one
ensures that one slot is assigned to at most one player.
max
∑
i,j
E(vi,αi)∼Fi
[
βjαivi·xij(vi, αi)
]
∑
j
xij(vi, αi) ≤ 1 ∀i, vi, αi
∑
i
∑
(vi,αi)
fi(vi, αi)xij(vi, αi) ≤ 1 ∀j
xij(vi, αi) ≥ 0 ∀i, j, vi, αi
min
∑
i
∑
(vi,αi)
yi(vi,αi) +
∑
j
zj
yi(vi, αi) + fi(vi, αi)zj ≥ fi(vi, αi) · βjαivi
∀i, j, vi, αi
yi(vi, αi), zj ≥ 0 ∀i, j, vi, αi
Theorem 9 For every sequential second-price auction setting, the expected welfare of every perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is at least half the maximum welfare.
Proof Fix a Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ. Let π(σ(v,α), i) be the random variable indicating the slot
that player i receives in the equilibrium σ(v,α) given the valuation profile v and the quality factor
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profile α. Whenever σ and (v,α) are clear in the context, we simply write π(σ(v,α), i) as π(i).
Inversely, let π−1(σ(v,α), j) be the winner of slot j in profile σ(v,α). Note that π−1(σ(v,α), j)
is also a random variable.
Dual Variables. For fixed (vi, αi), denote B(vi, αi) the distribution of the equilibrium bid b =
σ
(
(vi,v−i), (αi,α−i)
)
. Recall that b = (b1, . . . , bn) where bi is a bid vector over bids bij — the equi-
librium bid that player i submits in the round selling slot j. Moreover, denote B−i the distribution
of the equilibrium bid b−i = σ−i
(
(vi,v−i), (αi,α−i)
)
= σ−i
(
v−i,α−i)
)
where the last equality is
due to the independence of distributions Fi’s. Define the dual variables as follows.
yi(vi, αi) := fi(vi, αi) · Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βπ(b,i) · αivi
]
,
zj := max
i
Eb−i∼B−i
[
βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j
]
Note that π−1(b−i, j) is the winner of slot j in the round selling slot j assuming that player i do
not participate to this round.
Feasibility. Fix a player i with valuation vi and quality factor αi, and a slot j. We show that
the dual constraint corresponding to i, j, vi, αi is satisfied. By the dual variable definitions and the
independence of distributions, it is equivalent to prove that:
Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βπ(b,i) · αivi + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j
]
≥ βj · αivi (6)
We prove this inequality through a choice of a hypothetical deviation of player i and use the
assumption that σ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We first make some observations. Consider a fixed
valuation profile v−i, a fixed quality factor profile α−i and a realization of (mixed) equilibrium
σ
(
(vi,vi), (αi,α−i)
)
, denoted as b = (b1, . . . , bn). Now the assignment π of slots to players is
completely determined. There are three different cases.
Case 1: Player i receives some slot π(i) ≤ j. Then βπ(i) · αivi ≥ βj · αivi since βπ(i) ≥ βj .
Case 2: π(i) > j and απ−1(j)bπ−1(j),j ≥ αivi. Then βj · απ−1(j) · bπ−1(j) ≥ βj · αivi.
Case 3: π(i) > j and απ−1(j)bπ−1(j),j < αivi. Note that in this case in the round j, player i
could have submitted a bid without violating the no-overbidding property such that the
corresponding effective bid is infinitesimal larger than απ−1(j)bπ−1(j),j and could have received
slot j.
We are now choosing a bid deviation in order to prove the dual constraint based on the fact
that σ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, the different cases above suggest the following
deviation. For the first two cases, the term inside the expectations in the left-hand-side of (6) is
already larger than the right-hand-side (so no need to deviate). Hence, the deviation is necessary
only in Case 3.
Formally, we define the (mixed) deviation b
′
i as follows. First, player i follows the equilibrium
strategy bi. If until the allocation step of slot j, player i has not received to any slot then submit vi.
As σ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the utility of player i is at least that induced by this deviation.
Specifically,
Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
ui(b)
]
≥ Eb−i∼B−iEb′i
[
ui(b
′
i, b−i)
]
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where since (vi, αi) is fixed, for short, we write ui(b) = ui(b; vi, αi).
By definition of the deviation b′i, player i follows the same equilibrium strategy bi if Case 1
happens. Therefore, the above inequality is equivalent to
Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
ui(b)
∣∣Case 2 or Case 3] ≥ Eb−i∼B−iEb′i
[
ui(b
′
i, b−i)
∣∣Case 2 or Case 3] (7)
Note that if Case 3 holds then player i gets slot j with the payment
α
pi−1(b
−i,j)
b
pi−1(b
−i,j),j
αi
. So
Eb−i∼B−iEb′i
[
ui(b
′
i, b−i)
∣∣Case 3] = Eb−i∼B−i
[
βj · αi
(
vi −
απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j
αi
)∣∣Case 3] (8)
We are now ready to prove the inequality (6). We have
Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βπ(b,i) · αivi + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j
]
=
∑
ℓ=1,2,3
Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βπ(b,i) · αivi + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j
∣∣Case ℓ]
≥ Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βj · αivi
∣∣Case 1]+ Eb∼B(vi,αi) [βπ(b,i) · αivi + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j∣∣Case 2 or 3]
≥ Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βj · αivi
∣∣Case 1]+ Eb∼B(vi,αi) [ui(b) + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j∣∣Case 2 or 3]
≥ Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βj · αivi
∣∣Case 1]+ Eb∼B(vi,αi) [ui((b′i, b−i)) + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j∣∣Case 2 or 3]
≥ Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βj · αivi
∣∣Case 1 or 2]+ Eb∼B(vi,αi) [ui((b′i, b−i)) + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j∣∣Case 3]
≥ Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βj · αivi
∣∣Case 1 or 2]
+ Eb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βj · αivi − βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j + βj · απ−1(b−i,j)bπ−1(b−i,j),j
∣∣Case 3]
= Eb∼B(vi,αi) [βj · αivi] = βj · αivi
The first inequality follows the assumption of Case 1: βπ(i) ≥ βj . The second inequality holds
since the utility ui(b) ≤ βπ(b,i) · αivi. The third inequality is due to (7). The fourth inequality
follows the assumption of Case 2: απ−1(j)vπ−1(j) ≥ αivi. The last inequality follows (8). Hence, the
constructed dual variables form a dual feasible solution.
Bounding primal and dual. Let B be the distribution of equilibrium bid b = σ(v). The
expected welfare of equilibrium σ is Eb∼B
[∑
i βπ(b,i)αivi
]
. By the definition of dual variables, we
have ∑
i,(vi,αi)
yi(vi, αi) =
∑
i
E(vi,αi)∼FiEb∼B(vi,αi)
[
βπ(b,i)αivi
]
= Eb∼B
[∑
i
βπ(b,i)αivi
]
.
Besides, consider a slot j and let i∗ be the player such that
zj = Eb
−i∗∼B−i∗
[
βj · απ−1(b
−i∗ ,j)
bπ−1(b
−i∗ ,j),j
]
As the right-hand side is independent of bi∗ , we have
zj = Ebi∗Eb−i∗∼B−i∗
[
βj · απ−1(b
−i∗ ,j)
bπ−1(b
−i∗ ,j),j
]
= Eb
[
βj · απ−1(b
−i∗ ,j)
bπ−1(b
−i∗ ,j),j
]
Moreover,
zj ≤ Eb
[
βj · απ−1(b,j)bπ−1(b,j),j
]
≤ Eb
[
βj · απ−1(b,j)vπ−1(b,j)
]
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The first inequality holds since the effective bid of the slot-j-winner in round j including all players
is larger than that in case player i∗ does not participate. The last inequality is due to the non-
overbidding property. Summing over all j, we have
∑
j
zj ≤ Eb
[∑
j
βj · απ−1(b,j)vπ−1(b,j)
]
= Eb
[∑
i
βπ(b,i)αivi
]
.
Thus, the dual objective value is at most twice the expected welfare of the equilibrium. 
Remark. The non-overbidding assumption can be relaxed in the same way as the remark in
Section 4.2.1. Specifically, if players are allowed to bid up to a constant r times their valuations
(hence, the utility of a winning player may be negative) then the PoA is at most (1 + r).
4.3.2 Sequential First Price Auctions in Matching Markets
Model. In the matching market problem, there are n players and m items. Each player i has
private unit-demand valuation vi : 2
[m] → R defined as viS := maxj vij where vij is the valuation
of player i on item j. Note that in the sponsored search problem vij ≥ vij′ for every j < j
′ and
for every player i, while in the matching market problem it might be that for some items j, j′ and
some players i, i′, vij > vij′ and vi′j < vi′j′ . The valuation vector vi is drawn from a publicly known
distribution Fi. In the model, we assume that the distributions Fi’s are mutually independent. An
outcome is an assignment of items to players.
In the auction, the auctioneer sells items sequentially one-by-one via the first price mechanisms.
At the consideration of item j, the auctioneer collects all the bids bij on item j from all players. We
also assume that the non-overbidding property, meaning that bij ≤ vi for all i and j. The auctioneer
then assigns item j to the player with highest bid. Note that, in contrast to the sponsored search
problem, a player may receive multiple items. The payment of the winning player is simply the
winning bid. The utility of player i is (viS −
∑
j∈S bij) where S is its allocated items. The social
welfare of the outcome is
∑
i,j viS where the sum is taken over all players i and their corresponding
allocated items S.
Related work about sequential auctions have been summarized in the previous section. For the
matching market problem, Leme et al. [23] proved that the sequential auctions via the second price
mechanisms may lead to unbounded inefficiency. The authors [23] then considered the sequential
first price auctions and showed that in full-information settings, the PoA is at most 2 and 4 for
pure and mixed Nash equilibria. Subsequently, Syrgkanis and Tardos [40] extended the results
to incomplete-information settings. They proved a Bayesian PoA bound 2e/(e − 1) for matching
markets with independent valuations. They also raised a question whether the difference of PoA
bounds between the full-information settings and the incomplete-information ones is necessary.
In this section, we answer this question by showing that the (mixed) Bayesian PoA is at most 2.
In the proof, we use similar bluffing deviations as in [23, 40] and the primal-dual approach enables
the improvement. The proof follows similar structure as the one in Section 4.3.1; however, there is
a subtle difference compared to the sponsored search problem. In the latter, each player receives
at most one item (slot) so in constructing the hypothetical deviation, it is sufficient to design a
deviation in which the player gets one item, improves its utility and then leaves the game (bids
0 in subsequent rounds). In the matching market problem, a player may receive multiple items
hence the player would deviate in such a way that the player receives only the highest valuable
item without receiving (so paying for) items allocated in previous rounds. However, such deviations
may lead to completely different outcomes and the equilibrium structure could be very complex
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to analyze. Therefore, we do not reason directly on the utility of players in deviation. Instead,
we explore the connection between the winning bid and the player valuation. Consequently, the
argument works only for the sequential auctions via the first price mechanisms (but not via the
second price mechanisms).
Formulation. For every player i, every valuation vi and every set of items S, let xiS(vi) be a
variable indicating the interim assignment of S to player i. Consider the following formulation and
its dual. In the primal, the first and second constraints are relaxations of the facts that a player
receives a set of items and an item is assigned to at most one player, respectively.
max
∑
i,S
Evi∼Fi
[
viS ·xiS(vi)
]
∑
S
xiS(vi) ≤ 1 ∀i, vi
∑
i
∑
vi
fi(vi)
∑
S:j∈S
xiS(vi) ≤ 1 ∀j
xiS(vi) ≥ 0 ∀i, j, vi
min
∑
i
∑
vi
yi(vi) +
∑
j
zj
yi(vi) + fi(vi)
∑
j∈S
zj ≥ fi(vi) · viS ∀i, S, vi
yi(vi), zj ≥ 0 ∀i, j, vi
Theorem 10 For every sequential first-price auction, the expected welfare of every perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is at least half the maximum welfare.
Proof Fix a Bayes-Nash equilibrium σ. Let π(σ(v), i) be the random variable indicating the
set of items allocated to player i in the equilibrium given the valuation profile v. Inversely, let
π−1(σ(v), j) be the winner of item j. Note that π−1(σ(v), j) is also a random variable.
Dual Variables. For a fixed valuation vi, denote B(vi) the distribution of the equilibrium bid
b = σ(vi,v−i). Recall that b = (b1, . . . , bn) where bi is a bid vector over bij — the equilibrium
bid that player i submits in the round selling item j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Moreover, denote B−i the
distribution of the equilibrium bid b−i = σ−i(vi,v−i) = σ−i(v−i) where the last equality is due to
the independence of distributions. Define the dual variables as follows.
yi(vi) := fi(vi) · Eb∼B(vi)
[
vi,π(b,i)
]
,
zj := max
i
Eb−i∼B−i
[
bπ−1(b−i,j),j
]
Note that π−1(b−i, j) is the winner of item j assuming that player i does not participate to this
round.
Feasibility. Fix a player i with valuation vi and a set of items S. We show that the dual constraint
corresponding to i, S, vi is satisfied. By the dual variable definitions and the independence of
distributions, it is equivalent to prove that:
Eb∼B(vi)
[
vi,π(b,i) +
∑
j∈S
bπ−1(b−i,j),j
]
≥ viS (9)
We prove this inequality through a choice of a hypothetical deviation of player i and use the
assumption that σ is a Nash-Bayes equilibrium. For any set of items U , let j∗(U) ∈ U be an item
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such that vj∗ = maxj∈U vij = viU . We first make some observations. Consider a fixed valuation
profile v−i and a realization of (mixed) equilibrium σ(vi,vi), denoted as b = (b1, . . . , bn). Now
the assignment π of items to players is completely determined. Let T = π(b, i). There are three
different cases.
Case 1: vi,j∗(T ) ≥ vi,j∗(S).
Case 2: vi,j∗(T ) < vi,j∗(S) (so j
∗(S) /∈ T ) and the round of j∗(S) is before the round of j∗(T ). In
this case, bπ−1(j∗(S)),j∗(S) ≥ vi,j∗(S) − vi,j∗(T ) since otherwise i could have improved its utility
by submitting a bid of value (vi,j∗(S) − vi,j∗(T )) and stop playing the remaining rounds (by
submitting bids 0).
Case 3: vi,j∗(T ) < vi,j∗(S) (so j
∗(S) /∈ T ) and the round of j∗(T ) is before the round of j∗(S).
Again, in this case, bπ−1(j∗(S)),j∗(S) ≥ vi,j∗(S) − vi,j∗(T ) by the same argument.
The cases suggest the following (mixed) deviation b
′
i of player i. Player i draws a random sample
of a valuation profile w−i ∈ F−i and determine the winning set T = π(σ(vi,w−i), i) and also item
j∗(T ). If vi,j∗(T ) ≥ vi,j∗(S) then player i follows the equilibrium strategy bi. Otherwise, player i first
follows strategy bi until the round of item j
∗(S). In the round of j∗(S), bid b′
i,j∗(S) = vi,j∗(S)−vi,j∗(T )
and in the subsequent rounds, bid 0.
As σ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the utility of player i is at least that induced by this deviation.
Specifically,
Eb∼B(vi)
[
ui(b)
]
= Ev−i∼B−iEσ
[
ui
(
bi,σ−i(v−i)
)]
≥ Ew−i∼B−iEσ
[
ui
(
b′i,σ−i(w−i)
)]
where since vi is fixed, for short, we write ui(b) = ui(b; vi). By definition of the deviation b
′
i, player
i follows the same equilibrium strategy bi if Case 1 happens. Therefore, by remaining variables,
the above inequality implies
Ev−i∼B−iEσ
[
b
π−1
(
σ−i(v−i),j∗(S)
)
,j∗(S)
∣∣Case 2 or 3] ≥ Ev−i∼B−iEσ
[
vi,j∗(S) − vi,j∗(T )
∣∣Case 2 or 3]
(10)
where T = π
(
σ−i(vi,v−i), i
)
the set of items allocated to i.
We are now ready to prove the inequality (9). We have
Eb∼B(vi)
[
vi,π(b,i) +
∑
j∈S
bπ−1(b−i,j),j
]
≥
∑
ℓ=1,2,3
Eb∼B(vi)
[
vi,π(b,i) + bπ−1(b−i,j∗(S)),j∗(S)
∣∣Case ℓ]
≥ Eb∼B(vi)
[
viS
∣∣Case 1]+ Eb∼B(vi) [vi,π(b,i) + bπ−1(b−i,j∗(S)),j∗(S)∣∣Case 2 or 3]
≥ Eb∼B(vi)
[
viS
∣∣Case 1]+ Eb∼B(vi) [vi,π(b,i) + (vi,j∗(S) − vi,j∗(T ))∣∣Case 2 or 3]
= viS
The first inequality holds since j∗(S) ∈ S and the bids are non-negative. The second inequality
holds due to the assumption of Case 1. The third inequality follows Inequality (10). Hence, the
constructed dual variables form a dual feasible solution.
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Bounding primal and dual. By the definition of dual variables, we have
∑
i,vi
yi(vi) =
∑
i
Evi∼FiEb∼B(vi)
[
vi,π(b,i)
]
= Eb
[∑
i
vi,π(b,i)
]
.
Besides, consider an item j and let i∗ be player such that
zj = Eb
−i∗∼B−i∗
[
bπ−1(b
−i∗ ,j),j
]
As the right-hand side is independent of bi∗ , we have
zj = Ebi∗Eb−i∗∼B−i∗
[
bπ−1(b
−i∗ ,j),j
]
= Eb
[
bπ−1(b
−i∗ ,j),j
]
≤ Eb
[
bπ−1(b,j),j
]
Summing over all items j, we get
∑
j
zj ≤ Eb
[∑
j
bπ−1(b,j),j
]
= Eb
[∑
i
∑
j∈π(b,i)
bij
]
≤ Eb
[∑
i
vi,π(b,i)
]
where the last inequality is due to non-overbidding property. Thus, the dual objective value is at
most twice the expected welfare of the equilibrium. 
5 Conclusion
In the paper, we have presented a primal-dual approach to study the efficiency of games. We have
shown the applicability of the approach on a wide variety of settings and gave simple and improved
analyses for several problems in settings of different natures. Beyond concrete results, the main
point of the paper is to illuminate the potential of the primal-dual approach. In this approach,
the PoA-bound analyses now can be done similarly as the analyses of LP-based algorithms in
Approximation/Online Algorithms. We hope that linear programming and duality would bring
new ideas and techniques, from well-developed domains such as approximation, online algorithms,
etc to algorithmic game theory, not only for the analyses and the understanding of current games
but also for the design of new games (auctions) and new concepts leading to improved efficiency.
Acknowledgement. We thank Tim Roughgarden for pointing out some related works.
References
[1] Robert J Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of mathe-
matical Economics, 1(1):67–96, 1974.
[2] Martin Beckmann, CB McGuire, and Christopher B Winsten. Studies in the economics of
transportation. Technical report, 1956.
[3] Kshipra Bhawalkar and Tim Roughgarden. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with
item bidding. In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete
Algorithms, pages 700–709. SIAM, 2011.
[4] Kshipra Bhawalkar, Sreenivas Gollapudi, and Kamesh Munagala. Coevolutionary opinion
formation games. In Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 41–50. ACM, 2013.
31
[5] Kshipra Bhawalkar, Martin Gairing, and Tim Roughgarden. Weighted congestion games:
the price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness. ACM Transactions on
Economics and Computation, 2(4):14, 2014.
[6] Vittorio Bilo. A unifying tool for bounding the quality of non-cooperative solutions in weighted
congestion games. In International Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms, pages
215–228, 2012.
[7] Avrim Blum, Eyal Even-Dar, and Katrina Ligett. Routing without regret: On convergence to
nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games. Theory of Computing, 6(1):
179–199, 2010.
[8] Niv Buchbinder and Joseph Naor. The design of competitive online algorithms via a primal:
dual approach. Foundations and Trends R© in Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2–3):93–263,
2009.
[9] Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou,
Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, and Eva Tardos. Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes
in generalized second price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 156:343–388, 2015.
[10] Roberto Cominetti, Jose´ R Correa, and Nicola´s E Stier-Moses. The impact of oligopolistic
competition in networks. Operations Research, 57(6):1421–1437, 2009.
[11] Jose´ R Correa, Andreas S Schulz, and Nicola´s E Stier-Moses. A geometric approach to the price
of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games. Games and Economic Behavior, 64(2):457–469,
2008.
[12] Constantinos Daskalakis and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy
is easy. In 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS),, pages
219–228, 2016.
[13] Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz. Internet advertising and the
generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. The American
economic review, 97(1):242–259, 2007.
[14] Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, and Brendan Lucier. Simultaneous auctions are (almost)
efficient. In Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing,
pages 201–210. ACM, 2013.
[15] Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, and Vasilis Syrgkanis.
The price of anarchy in large games. In Proc. 48th Symposium on Theory of Computing
(STOC), pages 963–976, 2016.
[16] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game theory, 1991.
[17] Tobias Harks. Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow.
Theory of Computing Systems, 48(4):781–802, 2011.
[18] Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, and Noam Nisan. Non-price equilibria
in markets of discrete goods. In Proc. 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages
295–296, 2011.
32
[19] Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. Computer science re-
view, 3(2):65–69, 2009.
[20] Vijay Krishna. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
[21] Janardhan Kulkarni and Vahab Mirrokni. Robust price of anarchy bounds via lp and fenchel
duality. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Al-
gorithms, pages 1030–1049. SIAM, 2015.
[22] Se´bastien Lahaie, David M Pennock, Amin Saberi, and Rakesh V Vohra. Sponsored search
auctions. Algorithmic game theory, pages 699–716, 2007.
[23] Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and E´va Tardos. Sequential auctions and externalities. In
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages
869–886. SIAM, 2012.
[24] Giorgio Lucarelli, Nguyen Kim Thang, Abhinav Srivastav, and Denis Trystram. Online non-
preemptive scheduling in a resource augmentation model based on duality. In European Sym-
posium on Algorithms, 2016.
[25] Patrick Maille´, Evangelos Markakis, Maurizio Naldi, George D Stamoulis, and Bruno Tuffin.
Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects.
Electronic Commerce Research, 12(3):265–300, 2012.
[26] Konstantin Makarychev and Maxim Sviridenko. Solving optimization problems with disec-
onomies of scale via decoupling. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2014 IEEE
55th Annual Symposium on, pages 571–580. IEEE, 2014.
[27] Aranyak Mehta, Amin Saberi, Umesh Vazirani, and Vijay Vazirani. Adwords and generalized
online matching. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 54(5):22, 2007.
[28] Herve´ Moulin and J-P Vial. Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely
mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory, 7(3-4):201–
221, 1978.
[29] Uri Nadav and Tim Roughgarden. The limits of smoothness: A primal-dual framework for
price of anarchy bounds. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics,
pages 319–326, 2010.
[30] John F Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 36(1):48–49,
1950.
[31] Hans Peters. Game theory: A Multi-leveled approach. Springer, 2015.
[32] Robert W Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. International
Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):65–67, 1973.
[33] Tim Roughgarden. Frontiers in mechanism design. Lecture 17, 2014.
[34] Tim Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. Journal of the ACM (JACM),
62(5):32, 2015.
[35] Tim Roughgarden. The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. ACM Transac-
tions on Economics and Computation, 3(1):6, 2015.
33
[36] Tim Roughgarden and Florian Schoppmann. Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in
splittable congestion games. Journal of Economic Theory, 156:317–342, 2015.
[37] Tim Roughgarden and E´va Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? Journal of the ACM (JACM),
49(2):236–259, 2002.
[38] Tim Roughgarden and E´va Tardos. Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic con-
gestion games. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2):389–403, 2004.
[39] Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Eva Tardos. The price of anarchy in auctions.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 59:59–101, 2017.
[40] Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Bayesian sequential auctions. In Proceedings of the 13th
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 929–944. ACM, 2012.
[41] Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Composable and efficient mechanisms. In Proceedings of
the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 211–220. ACM, 2013.
[42] Hal R Varian. Position auctions. international Journal of industrial Organization, 25(6):
1163–1178, 2007.
[43] Rakesh V Vohra. Mechanism design: a linear programming approach, volume 47. Cambridge
University Press, 2011.
[44] John Glen Wardrop. Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. Proceedings of the
institution of civil engineers, 1(3):325–362, 1952.
[45] David PWilliamson and David B Shmoys. The design of approximation algorithms. Cambridge
university press, 2011.
34
